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CAPITAL STRUCTURE AND A DIFFERENCE OF OPINION: STOCK 




The renewal of interest in the relationship between financial and economic 
development that occurred in the 1990s was stimulated by the ‘endogenous’ growth 
literature that became prominent towards the end of the previous decade. An 
association between measures of financial development and per capita GDP at the 
international level was already clear in Goldsmith’s (1969) research, and this finding 
had helped to motivate early theoretical work in the McKinnon-Shaw tradition. While 
this literature was able to show how development of the financial sector might 
improve the allocation of investment spending, and therefore the level of income, it 
lacked a clear mechanism linking the financial sector to the economy’s underlying 
rate of growth. The posited endogenous growth mechanisms were able to provide this 
link (Pagano, 1993). 
These theoretical developments in the 1990s were accompanied by empirical work 
that attempted both to clarify the direction of causality between financial and 
economic growth and the changes in financial structure that take place over time (for 
instance, Levine et al (2000) and Levine and Zervos (1998)). Recognising their rapid 
international integration during the 1990s, the key structural issue considered was the 
role of stock markets in the development process. Whereas empirical studies 
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confirmed their relatively late emergence, very strong correlation between stock 
market activity and real incomes was also evident (Levine and Zervos (1996) and 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (1996)). 
Despite the attention devoted to the topic, it is argued below that the basic 
developmental role of equity markets remains unsettled in recent literature, and that 
an approach from the perspective of the owner-entrepreneur seeking finance is able to 
offer clarification. An initial advantage of this viewpoint is that it is able to address a 
basic difficulty confronting theorising on the issue - the extent to which a distinctive 
developmental role for stock market finance might be compatible with the well-
known capital structure ‘irrelevance’ proposition of Modigliani and Miller (MM, 
1958). For such a role to be identified one, or more, of the assumptions underlying 
this proposition must be relaxed, and the first section below considers the choice with 
reference to financial structures in developing countries. 
A simple model of the entrepreneur’s decision is developed in the subsequent section 
and an expression for the optimal capital structure, in terms of the proportion of debt 
and outside equity used to fund a given project, is derived. The nature of the trade-off 
involved in this decision is then examined, and its empirical implications outlined, 
before international panel evidence on primary issues in developing country markets 
is presented. Although the model only examines formally the entrepreneur’s debt - 
                                                                                                                                            
• The author wishes to acknowledge the generous advice of Yingqi Wei and John Whittaker during the 
preparation of this paper. His occasional stubbornness is sufficient to absolve them of any 
responsibility for remaining errors. 
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(outside) equity financing decision, the concluding section argues that it is able to 
throw considerable light on the developmental role of stock markets. 
 
The capital structure decision: corporate theory and development practice 
An important advantage of stock market finance would arise should an optimal 
combination of debt and equity claims permit firms to minimise their overall cost of 
external funds. As this is the central benefit identified in the following analysis, the 
contrary view, that a firm’s market value is independent of its capital structure, must 
clearly be acknowledged (MM, op.cit. Proposition 1). Early attempts to reconcile 
these two positions noted that firms typically gain tax advantages through the 
deductibility of interest payments. Since this practical consideration would establish 
an overwhelming advantage for debt in the capital structure a countervailing benefit 
of equity finance was required in order to explain the mixed funding typically 
observed (MM, 1963). 
The introduction of bankruptcy costs (initially assumed absent by MM but, if present, 
more likely to arise with excessive debt) provided a plausible gain from equity issue 
and a possible ‘trade-off’ explanation for the debt-equity choice. As these costs would 
have to be quite substantial to offset the interest tax shield, however, additional costs 
of debt might need to be identified to explain the high levels of equity finance often 
observed (Myers, 1984, p. 580). Moral hazard arguments, for instance, draw attention 
to the incentive confronting shareholders in highly geared firms to engage in very 
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risky projects that offer high payoffs in good states but bankruptcy in poor ones. 
Recognition of the risk lowers market valuation as indebtedness rises, thereby limiting 
recourse to this form of finance (Jensen and Meckling, 1976, pp. 333-7). 
Although an optimal capital structure might be rationalised from these trade-off 
considerations, the extent to which they explain the wide variety of gearing patterns 
actually observed is contested (Myers, op.cit.). The opposing ‘pecking order’ view of 
financial structure relies on an adverse selection problem arising when management 
acts in the interests of existing (rather than new) shareholders and when information 
on new projects cannot easily be transmitted to investors. When managers have high 
confidence in their investment opportunities they will avoid dilution by issuing debt. 
Since equity will tend to be issued when failure is more probable, new equity issues 
will be discounted for their information content by the market (Myers and Majluf, 
1984). 
The abandonment in the pecking order approach of the shared information assumption 
underlying the MM proposition does not in itself imply the emergence of an optimal 
capital structure. While its key prediction that debt will normally be favoured over 
equity issue accords with traditional accounts of management behaviour, the inference 
has been challenged in more recent empirical studies (Myers, 1984 op.cit. and Frank 
and Goyal, 2003). Developments in the theoretical literature have, moreover, raised 
doubts about the relevance of the asymmetric information elements involved in 
existing explanations of capital structure determination. Agency problems, for 
example, which arise when management has control of assets financed by investors, 
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might be resolved by appropriate remuneration incentives, rather than by being 
indirectly contained through the firm’s capital structure (Hart, 2001). The apparently 
limited success of the two popular theories has encouraged attempts to develop 
approaches to capital structure choice based on the control provisions inherent in debt 
and equity contracts, rather than upon their traditional cash flow entitlement 
characteristics (ibid). 
This radical shift of focus has begun to influence theories of the role and emergence 
of equity markets in the course of economic development (Capasso, 2004). A notable 
case arises in the work of Boyd and Smith who specify potential bankruptcy costs in 
terms of the ‘costly state verification’ (CSV) faced by investors in the event of firm 
bankruptcy (1996). The requirement for investors to ascertain the true situation in 
these circumstances will involve CSV and will favour contracts that minimise the 
need for it to be incurred. A standard debt contract, where CSV is not required 
provided that contractual interest payments are made, has been shown to be the most 
efficient from this perspective (Townsend, 1979). 
In constructing their theory of the interaction between equity markets and 
development, Boyd and Smith recognise that the CSV assumption appears to leave 
little room for equity issues (with their implied need for the relatively continuous 
monitoring of variable dividend payments). Their solution is to assume that firms are 
able to choose between two technologies with returns from one only observable after 
CSV and the other with returns visible to all at no cost. For both technologies to be 
used, the former must be inherently more productive and the proportions in which 
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they are employed will depend on the magnitude of CSV. If the latter is low, the 
unobservable return technology will be particularly attractive, whereas high CSV 
endows the less productive (but observable) technology with some attraction to 
investors. 
With CSV assumed to arise from labour-intensive monitoring (on one interpretation), 
it will become increasingly important as real incomes rise (and as capital costs 
decline) in the process of development. As easily observable projects gain a financial 
advantage claims that are contingent on their performance (shares) will become 
increasingly attractive, providing motivation for the development of a stock market. 
Although the model developed on this basis is able to formalise a process of mutual 
reinforcement between financial sector development and economic growth, the 
implication that stock markets will facilitate the dominance of the less productive 
technology over time does not accord readily with intuition. 
The alternative perspective on the developmental role of stock markets offered below 
represents a departure from the literature’s current preoccupation with agency and 
associated contractual issues in the determination of financial structure. Instead, it 
emphasises the traditional view underlying the MM propositions that debt and equity 
are differentiated essentially by the nature of their associated returns – contractual 
interest and residual dividends (and/or capital gains). The justification for this 
retrogression is that it is able to shed light on the capital structure patterns that are 
typically observed in developing and emerging markets. More specifically it addresses 
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the case of the closely owned firm, substantially reliant on borrowed funds, that also 
issues minority equity positions to outside investors. 
Underlying much of the theorising on agency aspects of business finance has been the 
assumed separation between (equity) ownership and (management) control associated 
originally with the observations of Berle and Means (1932). Their early focus on US 
data appears today to be seriously misleading as a characterisation of corporate 
enterprise at the international level. While diffuse equity ownership is relatively 
typical in the US and UK, a study of the 20 largest companies in the 27 richest 
economies revealed that only 35 per cent could be described as Berle and Means 
corporations (La Porta et.al., 1999). Thirty per cent were family owned, with this ratio 
rising to 45 per cent for medium sized firms in the rich economies. In a broader 
sample covering 45 countries the fraction of the shares held by the three largest 
shareholders in the ten largest companies averaged 46 per cent (median, 45 per cent) 
(La Porta et.al. 1998). Much higher levels of ownership concentration are evident in 
studies devoted to developing regions. In nine East Asian economies control was 
exercised by a single shareholder in two thirds of a total of 2980 listed companies 
(Claessens et.al. 2000). 
With such levels of concentration the agency considerations arising from the 
separation of ownership from control must, at least, change in focus. As observed in 
the East Asian case, the controlling shareholders will typically also be (or be related 
to) the management. While obviating concerns with asymmetric information for these 
groups, the position of ‘outside’ shareholders becomes problematic if pyramid 
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financial relationships permit the core shareholders to divert revenues to other, wholly 
owned, entities (La Porta et.al. 1999). When such arrangements permit core 
shareholders to exercise control rights significantly in excess of their cash flow rights, 
the danger of expropriation facing outside investors mounts. The studies by the last 
named authors appear to demonstrate that variations in the legal protections enjoyed 
by outside shareholders help to explain the degree of dispersion of ownership 
observed across countries. Indeed, concentrated ownership may be a response to weak 
legal protection for outside investors. 
Inadequate legal support, while likely to discourage minority share purchases, also 
raises the question as to why such investments nevertheless take place in countries 
where legal recourse in the event of expropriation is effectively minimal (Schleifer 
and Vishny, 1997 pp. 765-6). While these writers cite the importance of reputation 
effects in sustaining a market for outside equity, an important element of protection 
arises when the core investors, by holding a high fraction of the outstanding shares, 
have a large claim on residual cash flows. Recognised early in the literature as 
alleviating agency costs in general, large cash flow (as opposed to control) rights 
associated with majority ownership also act to diminish the incentive to divert 
revenues (Jensen and Meckling, op.cit. p313, La Porta, et.al. 1999, p. 511). In its 
focus on the decision confronting an owner-entrepreneur, therefore, the following 
analysis exploits the implied concentration of cash flow rights to side-step agency 
considerations and to base the choice of the debt-equity ratio entirely on the 
traditional cash flow entitlements of the two claims. 
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The market and the entrepreneur’s opinion 
The essential aspect of the following analysis is that the return expectations of the 
owner-entrepreneur (owner) differ from those held in the market from which finance 
is being sought. By eliminating the distinction between the management and 
‘existing’ shareholders in the original analysis of Myers and Majluf, the predominant 
equity holding of the owner is here assumed to permit the public issue of shares 
without generating the signalling difficulties that were central to that study. Another 
difference is that whereas Myers and Majluf assumed the manager’s information 
advantage to be ‘real’, the owner needs only to hold a relatively optimistic opinion 
about the potential returns of the project in the present case. 
The owner’s capital structure choice 
The owner is assumed to maximise the expected net value of the enterprise at a 
particular horizon (year T) attributable to a given (personal) equity holding. This 
formulation is equivalent to maximising the present value of the project provided that 
the personal discount rate applied is unaffected by the chosen capital structure. 
Although probably unrealistic when the personal holding may represent a large part of 
the owner’s portfolio, the assumption of risk neutrality permits concentration on the 
purely financial aspects of the debt-equity decision. Moreover, if a risk neutral 
entrepreneur might choose to issue shares on these grounds, a risk averse one would 
be more likely to do so, at least under practical financial constraints. 
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The project has fixed immediate cost (K) and will be financed by the owner’s initial 
equity stake (of monetary value M, also representing M unit shares), the public 
flotation of S shares (at the unit price b) and an initial loan (L) as in the following 
balance sheet: 
LbSMK ++=                                                  (1) 
The initial value of the loan (if insolvency is avoided) will be repaid with interest in a 
single ‘bullet’ payment at time T, amounting to LeL iT≡  at the interest rate i. The 









)(                      (2) 
E(VT) is the (subjectively) expected value of the owner’s share of the project at T and 
the probability distribution of returns (G) also reflects a personal assessment. Should 
realised returns at T fall short of the lower limit defined by the accumulated debt L  
(implying insolvency) the owner would receive nothing. The balance sheet 
( bSMKL −−≡ ) requires that the owner choose only the number of shares to be 
issued leaving loans as the residual source of finance. With both equity prices (b) and 
loan interest rates (i) affected by the choice of financing, maximisation of E(VT) in (2) 
with respect to S yields: 
)3()( Θ−=
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The term iTe∆ represents the change in the cost at T of repaying a unit of initial loan 





bS ≡ε  is the elasticity 
of the initial market share price with respect to such an issue.  The second order 
condition for a maximum at (3) confirms that an increase in S must lower both the 
unit share price and the interest rate charged on loans (implying that 0<bSε  and 
0<∆ iTe ). In addition, it is necessary that 1<bSε  to ensure that 0<dSLd . 
Finally, interpretation of (3) is facilitated if the owner’s expected valuation is 
converted to a per unit share basis as follows: 
}*{)( * MebVE TkT =  
The curled bracket term is the product of the owner’s personal valuation of a share in 
the enterprise (b*), the subjective cost of capital applied to the investment ( Tke * ) and 
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the total number of ‘inside’ shares held (M). Making these substitutions, the first order 
condition in (3) becomes: 
)4(])1([* * Θ∆−+= iTbSiTTk eLbeeb ε  
Intuitively, therefore, the owner will equate the anticipated marginal ‘revenue’ from 
equity issue (the right side of (4)) with the marginal cost (the subjectively anticipated 
valuation of a share at T) on the left. The square bracket term in (4) separates the gain 
from debt reduction arising directly from the issue (when used to retire or to avoid 
equivalent borrowing at the outset) and that arising from the reduced interest payment 
accumulated on the remaining debt. These potential gains from a marginal issue must 
finally be adjusted for the owner’s probability assessment (represented by Θ) that the 
debt will in fact be repaid at T (that insolvency will be avoided). 
Rearrangement of (4) yields a solution for the optimal capital structure and expresses 























With the numerator in the square bracket term necessarily positive at the optimum (for 
the denominator of (4a) to be non-zero, in view of (4)), the assumption that equity 
issue reduces the interest rate charged on loans ensures a negative value for the ratio. 
The fraction of the external capital requirement raised through equity issue will 
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therefore be affected critically by the discrepancy between the owner’s and the 
market’s anticipation of returns on the project. The greater the market ‘discount’ from 
the owner’s perspective (the smaller, ceteris paribus, is b relative to b*), the smaller 
will be the reliance on outside equity finance. The numerator also implies that a low 
interest rate on loans would lead to a lower equity issue. By contrast, the more 
confident is the owner in ultimate success (the higher the value of Θ), the more 
attractive will be equity funding (since the high probability of debt repayment 
increases the value to the owner of improved borrowing terms). Equally evidently, the 
more responsive is the loan interest rate to the risk reduction implied by greater 
reliance on equity, captured by iTe∆ , the more the owner will be inclined to offer 
shares. 
The owner’s choice and the financial characteristics of debt and equity 
The result presented in alternative forms in Equations (4) and (4a) provides a model 
of the choice of capital structure in which the issue of equity is determined by the 
reaction to it of both the share price and the interest rate charged on loans. If efficient 
financial markets are assumed, however, these two responses will be jointly 
determined and the nature of the trade-off facing the entrepreneur may be clarified by 
explicit recognition of this connection. In pricing its claims on the enterprise, the 
equity market may be expected to evaluate an expression of similar form to Equation 
(2) above. With the key distinction that the market value incorporates a different 
return distribution from that of the entrepreneur (indicated by H rather than G), the 
following would therefore determine the anticipated value of (all of) the equity: 
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An alternative representation of (5) will help later to clarify the calculations 
confronting the owner. Defining the market’s anticipated overall mean (debt-free) 
valuation of the real assets as TKe ρ leads to the following implication: 
∫∞=
MIN
T adHHHfKe )6()(ρ  
The lower limit in (6a), LMIN <  is the minimum possible valuation of the assets at 
T and may be taken as the scrap (or collateral) value at that time. Noting that 
∫∞ =
MIN
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MT −+−= ∫ρ  
This is the familiar interpretation of the expected market value of the shares as a call 
option. The right side confirms that the call amounts to a ‘long’ position in the assets 
of the firm (with the holding financed by debt) and the anticipated value of a put 
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option (represented by the curled bracket term) should returns be insufficient to repay 










Noting that Θ represents unity minus the owner’s bankruptcy probability in (4) above, 














The left side of (8) represents the discrepancy between the owner’s anticipated value 
of a unit share at T and the market’s marginal equivalent equity valuation at that time. 




d ≈+≡ )()(  
the difference is approximately that between the owner’s and the market’s expected 
value of a share at T, given the issue decision. The square bracket term on the right is 
the familiar effective reduction in due loan repayment at T resulting from a marginal 
equity issue, while the contents of the curled bracket capture the difference between 
the implied bankruptcy probability distributions underlying the two perspectives. 
Equation (8) indicates that the owner’s chosen financial structure in (4) will be 
compatible with efficient market pricing when the market discount on the share price 
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(as perceived by the owner) is offset by a smaller probability (from the same 
viewpoint) that bankruptcy will prevent the repayment of debt obligations. In 
summary, the owner’s opinion is that the market undervalues the shares of the 
enterprise and overly discounts its debt. At the margin, the implied loss on issuing the 
former must be offset through retirement (or reduction) of the latter. 
By permitting the owner’s opinion to differ from that implied by the market 
consensus, this result emphasises that the capital structure decision can be derived 
from the financial characteristics of debt and equity claims alone. Each instrument has 
a potential comparative advantage for the owner. Whereas the share price may not 
reflect fully the (subjectively) expected value of the enterprise, this bias will be of less 
central importance in affecting the terms of borrowing. By contrast, the relatively ‘fat’ 
tail of the H (vis-à-vis the G) distribution is a factor offsetting equity under-valuation 
as the option formulation in (5a) indicates. With this benefit achieved at the potential 
expense of creditors, however, the terms of borrowing will be directly affected. As in 
the original pecking order argument, therefore, a more optimistic assessment of the 
mean return by the owner will bias the choice of finance towards debt. To the extent 
that the relative optimism also takes the form of a greater degree of certainty about the 
returns, however, the case for equity funding gains strength. 
This distinction was clearly recognised in the conjecture originally offered by Myers 
and Majluf to explain why, in their debt-oriented analysis, managers may sometimes 
choose to issue equity (op.cit, p.209). Despite its ability to define an optimal capital 
structure (otherwise absent in the pecking order approach), however, little emphasis 
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appears to have been given to the case. One reason for believing that this could 
amount to a significant oversight, at least in the development context, is that a role for 
entrepreneurial expectations in the financial structure-growth relationship is 
suggested. This connection, and its relevance for interpreting the role of equity 
markets in the process of economic development, will be taken up following 
consideration of empirical evidence bearing on the perspective developed above. 
Empirical perspectives on the equity issue decision 
The most immediate empirical implications deriving from the equilibrium described 
in Equation (4) relate to the extent to which debt and equity are substitutes or 
complements as sources of finance. Empirical attempts to answer this question in the 
development literature have examined whether the growth of equity markets leads to a 
relative decline in firm indebtedness and have tended to conclude, to the contrary, that 
the two sources are complementary (Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1995), 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (1996)). The perspective presented by Equation (4) is that 
they are more appropriately considered to be both, as (physical) capital and labour 
may be so regarded in a production function. 
The relative attractiveness to the owner of issuing the two claims is seen to depend on 
the interest rate and the market equity valuation, suggesting a substitute relationship at 
the margin. With reference to the production function analogy, however, an important 
qualification to this interpretation is that, on both theoretical and empirical grounds, 
the costs of equity and debt will not be determined independently. Nevertheless, a rise 
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in the market’s valuation of the equity (b, with b* unchanged) will represent a decline 
in the cost of that source, and an opportunity for substitution, from the owner’s 
viewpoint. Setting such changes in market conditions aside, the chief characteristic of 
the formulation in Equation (4) is that it identifies an optimal capital structure in 
which the attraction to the owner of a public share issue lies in a reduction in the cost 
of debt finance. As the need for outside funds (K-M) grows, therefore, the two sources 
are complements in the sense that increased use of machines is able to reduce unit 
labour cost as production expands. 
Striking evidence that appears to be consistent with the dual interpretation presented 
here is contained in a detailed case study of the decision of firms to make initial 
public share offers (IPOs) in Italy (Pagano, et.al. 1998). The main determinant of the 
probability that a firm would engage in an IPO was found to be the market to book 
ratio for similar firms, confirming the relevance of market prices in the calculation. In 
the cases where offers were made, the funds raised were typically used to reduce debt 
accumulated during an earlier phase of expansion. The implication that firms were 
aiming for a less strained gearing ratio indicates the complementary aspect, and is 
supported by the finding that the cost of credit tended to decline after the IPO. 
A complementary relationship that is surprisingly strong also arises in evidence of the 
type cited above connected with developing countries: stock market growth promotes 
the issue of shares but is actually associated with a rise in debt-equity ratios. Evidence 
on substitution, however, is also available in the widely remarked tendency (in both 
advanced and developing economies) for firms to issue shares when market prices are 
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high. Such ‘timing’ of issues, though obvious intuitively, has always been 
‘embarrassing’ in theory (Myers, 1984, op.cit. p. 586). The theoretical unease 
disappears in the result presented in Equation (4), however, since the owner would 
certainly be expected to take advantage of an increase in the market’s ‘appetite for 
risk’, provided that this served to narrow the gap between the two perspectives 
involved (b relative to b*). The implication that market booms would promote equity 
issue receives strong empirical support in Singh (1997) for a wide range of developing 
countries. 
With empirical studies appearing collectively to support the view that equity issues 
can be both substitutes and complements for debt, the examination below of evidence 
on developing country primary equity issues attempts clarification of the relative 
strength of the two motivations during the 1990s. 
Data on emerging market issues 
The data cover twenty countries1 over the period 1989 to 2000, and were drawn 
initially from the larger sample developed by Aylward and Glen (1999). These 
authors used national sources and direct enquiries to construct series for primary 
equity issues in current $US and as a ratio of GDP over the years 1980-95. This 
original source is here extended from the World Federation of Exchanges (WFE) web 
site to cover issues in the years 1995-2000.2 Data for the ratio of stock market 
capitalisation and for credit to the non-bank private sector to GDP were drawn from 
                                                 
1 Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Greece, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Korea, 
Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, Philippines, Portugal, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey and Venezuela. 
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the Beck and Levine financial development database available electronically from the 
World Bank.3 The objective of obtaining a balanced panel over the decade 1990-2000 
(requiring figures for 1988-9 for differencing purposes) resulted in inclusion of the 
twenty countries listed in Footnote 1. 
The attempt here to extend the primary issues data collected by Aylward and Glen 
must be qualified by two caveats. Individual discrepancies in observations for the 
available common year (1995), while exhibiting no consistent pattern, were 
occasionally large and may reflect more general problems of comparability between 
the two sources. The second concern arises in the substantial revisions sometimes 
reported in the sequence of current and preceding year data on the WFE site. 
Although possibly helping to explain the discrepancies in relation to the last year of 
figures available to Aylward and Glen, the evident uncertainties surrounding the 
collection of these data suggested that each annual observation from the WFE source 
should be taken from its (later) reported value in the subsequent year. Figures for 
1995, for example, were drawn below from the comparison figures in the reported 
data for 1996. 
Despite the uncertainties arising from the joining of the two data sources, one of the 
main conclusions on cross-country patterns in the earlier study is supported for the 
extended period. In addition to variations in accounting standards (an indicator of 
transparency) Aylward and Glen found that the market capitalisation to GDP ratio 
                                                                                                                                            
2 http://www.fibv.com/WFE/home.Asp?nav=ie 
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(taken as an index of market depth) was the most reliable indicator of issue activity by 
country. This relationship is depicted in Figure 1 below, which plots (the logarithm 
of) the mean values of the issue to GDP and capitalisation to GDP ratios over the six 
years of WFE data, 1995-2000. The observations are for twenty-three countries 
comprising the twenty identified in Footnote 1 with the addition of Israel, Morocco 
and South Africa, for which complete figures for the shorter period were available 
from the sources employed. 
FIGURE 1 
While acting to reduce the influence of relatively extreme observations the 
logarithmic transformation also suggests a cross-country ‘elasticity’ of issues in 
relation to capitalisation of approximately 0.75 over the second half of the 1990s. 
With the emphasis placed earlier on the choice of financial structure, however, the 
relationship between equity issues and credit extended to the private sector is also of 
interest. Figure 2 plots the equivalent relationship for the same years and countries. 
FIGURE 2 
At least for the period involved, the strength of the association between these two 
variables is similar to that reported in Figure 1 and suggests that the issue ratio tends 
to rise in step with the private credit ratio. Before examining the direction of causality 
between the variables, the association in Figure 2 is of interest in terms of the possible 
                                                                                                                                            




complementary relationship between borrowing and equity issuance. At the level of a 
growing enterprise, this would imply an association between share issues and the 
change in the firm’s indebtedness. In terms of aggregate data, however, credit is 
constantly turned over between entities so that equity issues would be observed even 
if credit aggregates were unchanged year on year. This would also be the case if, as in 
the Italian example, firms issue equity to reduce their gearing ratios and thereby 
permit credit lines to be reallocated. 
Determinants of equity issues: panel analysis 
To examine whether any causal inferences may be derived from the associations in 
Figures 1 and 2, a panel VAR system involving annual observations for the issues, 
capitalisation and private credit ratios was estimated. Since both the issues and 
capitalisation ratios are subject to occasional large variations at the country level, and 
as the issues series also contains some zero observations in individual years, the data 
were transformed into logarithms of one plus their values. Finally, differencing of the 
transformed variables addressed effectively the evidence provided by a battery of 
panel unit root tests that the data in levels were non-stationary. The results from 
estimation of the VAR system are reported in Table 1, with the two-lag structure 
chosen on the basis of the Schwartz criterion. Country fixed effects were incorporated 
in the specification but were omitted from the table to conserve space. The ‘euro’ 
dummy identifies observations for 1998-2000 in the cases of Greece and Portugal, as 
some very large issues ratios were recorded in these years that are likely to have 
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reflected portfolio adjustments surrounding the two countries’ impending 
participation in the single currency.4 
TABLE 1 
Neglecting their own lagged values, the following features of the reported 
relationships between the variables are noticeable. The new issue ratio appears not to 
be influenced (at conventional levels of significance) by changes in market valuation 
and, if any relationship exists, it does not arise in the first year. By contrast, the one-
year lagged credit term provides evidence of a significant direct (positive) connection. 
The second equation suggests that the credit variable is influenced quite strongly in 
turn, albeit after a lag of two years, by changes in the market capitalisation to GDP 
ratio. Finally, the conclusion suggested by the third result is that the capitalisation 
ratio is only affected by its own previous values. Support for these inferences is 
supplied by the tests reported in Table 2: 
TABLE 2 
The evidence is clear in indicating that changes in market capitalisation during the 
decade of the 1990s were substantially exogenous in relation to the other elements in 
the VAR system. Valuation changes might also have been exogenous at this time in 
the broader sense that external influences were becoming more important through the 
increasing external integration of peripheral equity markets. The effect of such 
                                                 
4 Although Greece had not met the ‘convergence criteria’ to allow participation in the single currency 
from January 1st 1999, the country agreed to participate in the narrow bands (ERM 2) exchange rate 
arrangement on September 26th 1998. Portugal was a founder member of the euro. 
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changes was not directly to increase share issues: they appear instead to have 
influenced the loans market, which subsequently influenced the issue ratio. To 
summarise these interactions, the impulse response functions graphed in Figure 3 
trace the influence on the new issue ratio of a one standard deviation disturbance to 
the market capitalisation and private credit ratios. The positive response of equity 
issue to the latter contrasts with the lagged influence of the disturbance to the 
capitalisation ratio and presumably reflects an indirect mechanism operating through 
induced changes in the credit variable. 
FIGURE 3 
To summarise the conclusions relating to the question of equity as a substitute or as a 
complement for debt, the cross-country evidence appears to favour the view that 
equity issues in the 1990s complemented borrowing. The evidence that increased 
market capitalisation boosted issues directly is weaker than that for an indirect 
channel, by which changes in market capitalisation preceded an increase in credit 
granted to the private sector. Equity issues followed shortly after the credit expansion 
had occurred. As world equity markets were tending to strengthen through much of 
the 1990s the lack of a more direct influence on new issues is noteworthy, especially 
when set against Singh’s findings on developing country share issues in the 1980s. 
The substantial volumes of equity capital raised in the earlier decade were attributed 
to substitution by firms in response to the coincidence of elevated stock market 
valuations and high international and national (post-liberalisation) real interest rates. 
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While compatible with this finding the equilibrium described in Equation (4) also 
suggests that substitution need not arise if the improvement in equity market 
valuations is associated with an easing of credit conditions. Evidence that 
capitalisation changes had just this effect is quite strong in the VAR results and 
possibly reflects the lower real interest rates that characterised the international 
environment of during the 1990s. In the absence of a relative change in their costs, 
therefore, the analysis and evidence presented above are consistent with the view that 
owners would regard equity and debt as complementary sources of finance for 
business expansion. The implications of this perspective for the relationship between 
stock markets and economic development will be discussed in conclusion. 
Conclusions: stock markets and development 
Minority equity issues by closely controlled enterprises are difficult to explain from 
the perspective of the current literature on corporate finance (Myers, 2000). They are 
nevertheless characteristic of developing country equity markets and one objective of 
this analysis has been to provide an explanation for the phenomenon. Since firms will 
normally be closely controlled in their early years, an understanding of the relevance 
of stock markets to economic development must encompass the initial motivation to 
seek equity funding by these enterprises. It was suggested above that the expedient of 
allowing the owner-entrepreneur’s expectations to differ from those of the financial 
and capital markets would permit an optimal capital structure, involving minority 
issue, to be defined. 
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For this result to be realistic, it was necessary to invoke the owner’s financial 
exposure to the project in order to suppress the adverse signalling aspects of new 
equity issues that have been a preoccupation at least since the analysis of Myers and 
Majluf (op.cit.). The basic assumption that the owner’s substantial cash flow rights 
would provide sufficient confluence of interests between ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ 
investors receives some further support from the nature of the equilibrium depicted in 
Equation (4). While it is apparent that an owner who is highly optimistic in relation to 
the expected (mean) return on the project will be disinclined to issue shares, a high 
degree of certainty in relation to that expectation would tend to prompt some equity 
issue. Expressed differently, if a minority issue takes place, the owner will be selling 
shares for less than they are believed to be worth. When proceeds from the issue are 
employed to reduce gearing, moreover, the signalling involved is essentially positive 
for outside investors. Although conflicts of interest will certainly arise in practice, the 
analysis is at least consistent with international evidence that they are not insuperable 
obstacles to minority investors in practice. 
The essential assumption that the owner does not share the market’s opinion of the 
likely returns to the project is more easily sustained in the context of development and 
change than it would be in essentially static economic circumstances. Entrepreneurial 
activity has been linked traditionally to the view that the individuals concerned are 
characterised by comparative optimism, and Schumpeter’s emphasis on financial 
support for entrepreneurial innovation has been invoked more recently in order to 
rationalise the empirical connection between financial intermediaries and economic 
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growth (King and Levine, 1993). On the interpretation offered here, the 
entrepreneur’s optimism relates both to the expected (mean) value of returns and to a 
comparatively high degree of certainty that those returns will be realised. By 
permitting the owner to obtain the least ‘disadvantageous’ combination of funding, 
the basic implication is that an equity market serves to increase the prospective 
rewards to entrepreneurial activity. 
With this mechanism suggesting a general link between stock markets and economic 
development, two observations were noted earlier in connection with the empirical 
evidence on the relationship involved. Measures of stock market activity are closely 
related to levels of per capita income internationally, and markets appear to emerge 
rather late in the development process. The equilibrium capital structure defined in 
Equation (4) suggests a starting point for interpretation of these findings. While the 
attraction of an equity issue will be affected by market valuations, it is also evident 
that the absolute size of the financing gap confronting the owner (K-M) tends to 
increase the proportion of external finance that takes the form of equity. An under-
capitalised owner seeking to rely on debt finance, for example, will confront a 
relatively unfavourable interest rate and an inducement to seek external equity for this 
reason. To explain the relationship between income levels and stock market activity, it 
might be hypothesised that the cost of the representative investment increases in 
relation to the resources of the representative entrepreneur as development proceeds. 
This hypothesis can be elaborated somewhat by reference to the types activities that, 
according to Equation (8), would be particularly encouraged by (or encouraging of) 
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the emergence of an equity market. That relationship makes clear that if equity issues 
take place, despite their (owner-perceived) under-valuation by the market, the owner 
must be anticipating a compensating gain in the form of the debt repayments that 
eventually will be made. The size of outstanding loans determines both the payments 
due and the probability that revenues will be insufficient to meet them. The right side 
of Equation (8) incorporates the division of opinion on this probability and, for a 
given amount of debt (L), will have a smaller value the closer are the minimum 
returns to the contractual payment due at T.  A useful simplification is to allow these 
lower limits to be the same and to reflect the agreed assessment of the collateral (or 
scrap) value of the project at that time. If the discrepancy between the owner’s and the 
market’s marginal equity valuation (the left of Equation (8)) is taken as given, the 
implication is that projects with higher (lower) collateral value would tend to be 
financed predominantly by debt (outside equity). 
Equally intuitive would be an extreme version of the case in which low collateral 
content, and a wide dispersion in the market’s view of the potential returns, might 
indicate a high fraction of outside equity finance. As already indicated, these 
tendencies would be reinforced should the owner’s own funds be rather limited. Such 
a context would approximate that of Cho (1986) in which high return-high risk 
projects might not receive loans, even in a reformed banking market. If high 
borrowing in these conditions would confer on equity valuation a significant ‘put 
option’ component (Equation (5a)), the potential cost to lenders might well be 
unacceptable. Cho’s analysis is compatible with this interpretation and is highly 
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appealing as an explanation of the emergence of ‘venture’ capital funding. 
Nevertheless, while using the same risk-return perspective, the analysis presented 
above appears more generally applicable to the developing country case by permitting 
firms to be financed by a mixture, depending on their debt capacity, of the two 
instruments. 
Drawing these elements together, the outcome described in Equations (4) and (8) is 
pertinent to the question of why stock markets appear at a relatively late stage in the 
process of financial development. Consistently with historical observation, recent 
theorising on the interaction between financial and real development has emphasised 
the transition from less to more specialised fixed (illiquid) capital investment in the 
course of economic growth (Hicks, 1969, pp. 141-5, Obstfeld, 1994). While this 
would be consistent with the cost of projects tending to rise relative to individual 
wealth, it is also probable that the increased specialisation of equipment would reduce 
its collateral value relative to the initial commitment of resources. Equity finance 
would gain in importance in the later stages of industrial development when 
equipment specialisation presents owners with the prospect of enhanced returns at the 
expense of greater potential losses on the downside. 
The ability to diversify these risks and to benefit thereby from enhanced overall 
returns must be the key attraction of a stock market from the viewpoint of portfolio 
investors. While it has been argued that market liquidity can facilitate growth by 
reconciling the permanent commitment of capital with a transitory holding by 
individual investors, it is not clear that this advantage differs fundamentally from the 
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maturity transformation traditionally conducted through the banking system. The 
benefit of market liquidity on the present interpretation is that it will facilitate 
attempts by individual portfolio investors to maintain a desired balance of risk and 
reward. To explain why stock markets tend to emerge only after a banking system has 
been long established, however, the claim made here is that the preferences of the 
entrepreneurs who seek external finance deserve at least as much consideration as 
those of fund suppliers have received to date. 
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 FIGURE 1: ISSUES AND CAPITALISATION-GDP RATIOS (LOG OF MEAN 1995-2000)


























 FIGURE 2: ISSUES AND CREDIT-GDP RATIOS (LOG OF MEAN 1995-2000)
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VECTOR AUTOREGRESSION ESTIMATES 
 
 Sample (adjusted): 1991 2000  
 Included observations: 200 after adjustments 




DLOG(ISSUES(-1)) -0.525661 -0.002582  0.005036 
  (0.07208)  (0.00445)  (0.01114) 
 [-7.29246] [-0.57994] [ 0.45215] 
    
DLOG(ISSUES(-2)) -0.340284 -0.005406 -0.011331 
  (0.07706)  (0.00476)  (0.01191) 
 [-4.41592] [-1.13578] [-0.95159] 
    
DLOG(CREDIT(-1))  2.333214  0.386926  0.047593 
  (1.16397)  (0.07190)  (0.17986) 
 [ 2.00453] [ 5.38155] [ 0.26461] 
    
DLOG(CREDIT(-2)) -1.251743 -0.165664 -0.095963 
  (1.14861)  (0.07095)  (0.17749) 
 [-1.08979] [-2.33494] [-0.54068] 
    
DLOG(CAPN(-1)) -0.080563 -0.015269  0.432387 
  (0.47434)  (0.02930)  (0.07330) 
 [-0.16984] [-0.52113] [ 5.89919] 
    
DLOG(CAPN(-2))  0.777084  0.112330 -0.311165 
  (0.48062)  (0.02969)  (0.07427) 
 [ 1.61682] [ 3.78367] [-4.18981] 
    
C  0.063869  0.011638  0.002323 
  (0.15145)  (0.00935)  (0.02340) 
 [ 0.42173] [ 1.24402] [ 0.09925] 
    
EURO  1.064268  0.034290  0.078686 
  (0.24524)  (0.01515)  (0.03789) 
 [ 4.33978] [ 2.26363] [ 2.07646] 
 
 
 R-squared  0.307779  0.394297  0.269521 
 Adj. R-squared  0.203746  0.303266  0.159737 
 Sum sq. resids  37.02551  0.141272  0.884065 
 S.E. equation  0.462623  0.028576  0.071486 
 F-statistic  2.958467  4.331473  2.455029 
 Log likelihood -115.1167  441.7510  258.3664 
 Akaike AIC  1.421167 -4.147510 -2.313664 
 Schwarz SC  1.866440 -3.702237 -1.868392 
 Mean dependent  0.026818  0.009408  0.011275 
 S.D. dependent  0.518444  0.034235  0.077985 
 Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.)  8.73E-07  
 Determinant resid covariance  5.65E-07  
 Log likelihood  587.2966  
 Akaike information criterion -5.062966  




VAR GRANGER CAUSALITY/BLOCK EXOGENEITY WALD TESTS 
 
Sample: 1988 2000   
Included observations: 200  
Dependent variable: DLOG(ISSUES)  
Excluded Chi-sq df Prob. 
DLOG(CREDIT)  4.894658 2  0.0865 
DLOG(CAPN)  2.771973 2  0.2501 
All  8.460536 4  0.0761 
    
Dependent variable: DLOG(CREDIT)  
Excluded Chi-sq df Prob. 
DLOG(ISSUES)  1.322662 2  0.5162 
DLOG(CAPN)  14.95371 2  0.0006 
All  15.55182 4  0.0037 
    
Dependent variable: DLOG(CAPN)  
Excluded Chi-sq df Prob. 
DLOG(ISSUES)  1.636546 2  0.4412 
DLOG(CREDIT)  0.342107 2  0.8428 
All  1.956455 4  0.7438 
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